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French overseas trade in the eighteenth century was carried on, as 
always, by merchants living and working in the port cities. The economic 
life of these cities is one of the great fields in French history today and 
there are already substantial, sometimes brilliant, studies of Marseille, 
Nantes, Bordeaux, Rouen, and Le Havre. Useful work has been done on 
Saint Malo, La Rochelle, Bayonne, and Sete, and we may certainly look 
forward to others. 1 All of the historians in this field touch upon the subject 
of how Paris affected the business of the ports. On some aspects of this 
fascinating and complicated subject much information has come to light 
but few of the main questions have yet been satisfactorily answered. How 
much business did the Paris bankers do in the ports? What part did the 
Crown's financial agents, such as the naval treasurers, play in maritime 
trade? Why did Paris, with all its wealth and business life, fail to become 
a centre of marine insurance for French shipping? 
I 
This last question is particularly interesting because there were 
attempts to found large marine insurance companies in Paris in the middle 
of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, during the peaceful 1720s and 
later, French merchants faced the competition of Dutch and German 
* Department of History, York University. 
1 Charles CARRIERE, Negociants marseillais au XVIII' siecle (lnstitut historique 
de Provence, 1973), 2 vols; Jean MEYER, L'Armement nantais dans Ia deuxieme moitie 
du XVIII' siecle (Paris, 1969); Paul BUTEL, La Croissance commerciale bordelaise dans Ia 
seconde moitie du XVIII' siecle (these de lettres, Paris, Service de reproduction des theses, 
Universite de Lille III, 1973), 2 vols.; Pierre DARDEL, Commerce, industrie et navigation 
ii Rouen et au Havre au XVIII' siecle (Rouen, 1966), and Navires et marchandises dans 
les ports de Rouen et du Havre au XVIII' siecle (Paris, 1963); Jean DELUMEAU, Le Mou-
vement du port de Saint Malo (1681-1720) (Rennes, 1966); Henri RoBERT, « Les Trafics 
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rivals who enjoyed the services of large insurance companies at Rotterdam 
and Hamburg as well as of the usual private underwriters, and of British 
rivals whose capital city was already becoming the principal centre of 
marine insurance in western Europe. Not only the famous Lloyd's com-
pany but two others, the London Assurance and the Royal Exchange, 
had grown large and stable ever since their founding in 1720, and the 
ever-increasing numbers of independent underwriters formed a loose 
society of their own in 1774. 2 This great insurance market was open to 
French merchants, we are told, until the beginning of the wars with Britain 
in 1793, but why did they not tum to Paris, a French city of comparable 
size and wealth? This was certainly not because merchants were satisfied 
with insurance offered in the French ports, for it was so restricted and 
uncertain that ships were usually covered by two, three, or more policies 
purchased in as many different cities. 
To be useful, insurance on ships and cargoes had to be financially 
sound, available when needed, and as cheap as possible. These qualities 
depended partly on good management and partly on large financial re-
serves such as could be found only by organizing on a large scale. But 
insurance in France was organized on a relatively small scale because for 
each port it was in the hands of local merchants who managed it as an 
adjunct to their trade. They were loosely organized in chambers of insur-
ance, like specialized chambers of commerce, and each policy was usually 
sent around the town from merchant to merchant, each man signing for 
a fraction of the insured sum until enough had been subscribed. Unfor-
tunately these merchant underwriters, particularly the failing or bankupt 
ones, did not always honour their signatures. At the best of times, the 
insured customarily received three or four percent less than the sum 
insured, whereas London underwriters more and more tended to pay the 
full sum. In wars like those of the middle eighteenth century French 
premiums soared to 60 percent or more of the sum insured ; insurance 
became unobtainable, many ships had to sail without it, and the market 
broke down in a frenzy of litigation. 3 Many French underwriters collapsed 
in 1774 during the War of Austrian Succession. 4 In the Seven Years War, 
a Bayonne merchant wrote as early as spring 1757 to the Governor of 
Cape Breton Island (De royale), "Insurance is at such a frightful price 
2 A.H. JoHN, "The London Assurance Company and the Marine Assurance 
Market of the Eighteenth Century,,. Economica, n.s. XXV (1958): 126-41; A.H. JoHN, 
"Insurance Investment and the London Money Market of the 18th Century,,. Economica, 
n.s. XX (1953): 137-58; C. WRIGHT and C.E. FAYLE, A History of Lloyds, London (1928); 
C. Ernest Fayle, "Shipowning and Marine Insurance," in The Trade 
A Study of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars 1793-1815, C. Northcote 
PARKINSON, ed., (London, 1948), pp. 25-48; Barry SuPPLE, The Royal Exchange Assurance: 
A History of British Insurance 1720 - 1970 (London, 1970); and H. AMSINCK, "Die erste 
hamburgische Assekuranz-Compagnie und der Actionhandel in 1720," Zeitschrift des Vereins 
fur hamburgische Geschichte, IX, pp. 465 ff. 
3 Marine insurance is discussed by Carriere, Meyer, Butel, and Dardel in works 
cited above in footnote I. 
• A.H. JoHN, "The London Assurance Company," Economica, n.s. XXV (1958), 
p. 136. 
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that it makes people tremble to fit out ships for Louis bourg ... • • s Two 
years later, on 19 January 1759, Magon at Saint Malo wrote to Gradis at 
Bordeaux, who was preparing a fleet for the trans-Atlantic colonies, "our 
insurance company will not insure even at 60% now, much less at 55% as 
you ask." 6 The London companies, on the other hand, generally did well 
in wartime and rarely if ever closed their doors ; one of the reasons was 
that their collective resources were, for the age, enormous. Insurance in the 
French ports, whatever the deficiencies of its organization, suffered mainly 
by the fact that no single port, indeed no two or three together, could 
match the financial resources of London or the . main Dutch ports - but 
Paris could. 
In Paris, as in the ports, merchants and bankers were in the habit of 
individually subscribing to insurance policies, but this market never grew 
large, never gave rise to a chamber of insurance like those in the ports -
at least not for long - and never sustained a large, successful, and de-
pendable company. Even the Chambre d'Assurances Maritimes et Gros-
ses Aventures de France established by Louis XIV on 2 May 1668 lasted 
for only a few years. 7 The reasons for this may perhaps emerge in a 
study of the companies founded in the mid-eighteenth century. There 
were a least four of these, and for the first of them I have found only a 
note, hardly worth mentioning except as an aid to future research. The 
reference is to documents signed on 10 January 1747 providing for "the 
establishment of an insurance company in Paris and in all the maritime 
cities where the good of commerce requires it.'' 8 These documents were 
signed by two promoters or founders, Verdier and Heraud de Courcy, 
and by one of the shareholders, a certain Charles-Denis Perthuis, a 
Quebec merchant settled in Paris. 
A second company was founded three years later under the inspired 
direction of Oaude Hilaire Maisonneuve (or de la Maisonneuve), the son 
of an agent de change of Lyon. 9 Maisonneuve had acquired a good 
knowledge of insurance by studying the subject over a long period, it 
appears, and soon after the War of Austrian Succession he and two 
associates invited "all good merchants" to subscribe to a marine insurance 
5 Public Record Office (London), H.C.A. 30 264: B. Duvergier (Bayonne) to Che-
valier de Drucourt, lO March 1757. 
6 Archives departementales de l'lle-et-Vilaine (Rennes), I F 1897: Magon to Ben-
jamin Gradis, 19 Jan. 1759. 
7 Jean DELUMEAU, "Exploitation d'un dossier d'assurances maritimes au XVII• 
siecle," Melanges en l'honneur de Fernand Braude/ (Toulouse, 1973), II, pp. 135-63. 
8 Archives nationales (Paris), minutier central des notaires (henceforth M.C.), 
etude XCIII 17, 6 Feb. 1750, inventaire apres dices for Charles-Denis Perthuis who held 
a share of 6 sous in this company. 
9 This company and the following one of 1753 are usefully discussed in Herbert 
Luthy, La Banque protestante en France (Paris, 1961), pp. 351-54, but Luthy too hastily 
assumed that they were the same company and he does not mention the bankers company 
of 1755. On the Maisonneuve family, see M.C. (Paris), LXVII 650, 18 Aug. 1763, marriage 
contract for a brother, Gabriel Maisonneuve, then "secretaire de Ia compagnie d'assu-
rances generales," that of 1753. 
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company before Christmas Day 1749. 10 On 29 January 1750 these three 
and five others signed an agreement of twenty-one articles of which the 
third stated that a committee of seven directors and three consultants 
would be elected at the first general meeting. Articles five to ten provided 
for branches in the ports of the kingdom, the directors of which were to 
receive commissions of two percent of insurance premiums or other 
contracts they negotiated, except a La grosse aventure loans on which 
they might receive only one-half percent. The eight original members of 
the company, except one, described themselves as merchants (negociants 
or armateurs), but in the course of 1750 and 1751 the membership grew 
by the addition of some three or four score Paris businessmen who for 
the most part described themselves as interesses dans Les affaires du Roi, 
fermiers du Roy, bourgeois de Paris, secretaires du Roy, or some such 
title. There was even a tresorier de La Reine, an ancien directeur des postes 
de L' armee d' Italie, a controLeur de La Marine, and a chef de fruit erie de 
Sa Majeste. 11 
Maisonneuve thought of himself as a merchant and believed that 
merchants should be in control. A conflict developed in 1751 between two 
groups which Maisonneuve later described as Les financiers and Les com-
mer~ants, and to settle some points at issue between them, one of the 
consultants, Pierre-Fran!rois Goossens, who had a foot in each camp, 
being a merchant and merchant banker as well as a financier investing in 
naval supplies, suggested that a committee should be appointed. 12 At the 
meeting of 16 June 1751, a committee of thirteen was chosen including 
Goossens himself as chairman. This committee soon decided the issue in 
favour of the financiers who were in the majority. Two of their leaders, 
Alexis Regny and Jean-Henry Bousquet (or Bouquet), persuaded Maison-
neuve and the other directors to resign and then drew up a new set of 
ninety-three regulations which they induced the general meeting of the 
company to approve on 3 August 1751. 13 Henceforth the company was 
controlled not by merchants but by financiers, traitants, fermiers and 
rentiers. This new managing element was too inexperienced in insurance, 
in Maisonneuve's view, and on 7 June 1752 he submitted a memorandum 
on their errors and predicted disasters which, indeed, soon befell the 
company. It suspended its business in the summer of 1756, tried in vain 
to buy reinsurance in England and Holland on its outstanding policies, 
and began to wind up its affairs. Some years before, some of those 
10 M.C. (Paris), CXVIII 459, 29 Jan. 1750. The name at this stage was La Chambre 
d'Assurance et Grosse Aventure, but it was soon loosely referred to as La Compagnie 
d'Assurances. For convenience I have translated interet as "share" and interesse as "mem-
ber" because in this as in most companies at the time subscribers to a company were 
active partners or participants, not shareholders (actionnaires holding actions). Members 
took part in the management of the company, and their liability was not, it seems, limited. 
11 M.C. (Paris), etude CXVIII 460, 6 Feb. 1750 passim. For these names see 
Table 1. 
12 Maisonneuve's brief discussion of the issue is in a printed Memoire ii consulter 
pour le sieur Maisonneuve, 23 pp., (Bibliotheque nationale, Paris, mss. Joly de Fleury 
303), p. 8. 
13 A copy of the new regulations may be found in A.N. (Paris), Z 10 129 and another 
in M.C. (Paris), etude CXVII 459, 460. 
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whom Maisonneuve described as commerrants had left the company: 
Laurent Woulfe and Nicolas-Robert Darcy, two Jacobite bankers, on 18 
August 1751; another group of five led by Goossens on 8 October 1751; 
and Maisonneuve himself with several others in 1753. In April 1755 their 
quarrel with the company was taken before the Admiralty Court of France 
where Maisonneuve accused Regny and Bousquet of spreading malicious 
gossip about him and other members of the company in letters to Bor-
deaux.14 
When Maisonneuve quit the company it was to found another and 
this he did. In a printed circular which he sent out with letters to various 
Paris businessmen, he claimed this new company was intended to carry 
on insuring ships even in wartime, something the companies in the ports 
did not always do, and he also intended it to insure buildings against 
fire. 15 He called it, La Compagnie d'Assurances Generales Maritimes 
et Incendiaires, secured the patronage of the Admiral of France, the Due 
de Penthievre, and drew up nineteen founding articles providing for an 
organization much like the one laid down originally for the previous 
company: business agents in the ports, shares and members, a board of 
directors (syndics), and so on. The founding articles were approved by a 
general meeting of 27 September 1753 and the company immediately 
began to insure ships. 16 It continued to do so until heavy losses forced 
it, like the previous company, to suspend its business during the Seven 
Years War. 17 By this time Maisonneuve had withdrawn exactly as he 
withdrew from the previous company and for similar reasons. 
The interesting thing about the company of 1753 is that, like the 
previous one, it was composed mainly of financiers, bourgeois, and offi-
cials. Three of the six named as syndics on 22 March 1754 described 
themselves as interesses dans les affaires du Roy'; one as conseiller du 
Roy commissaire a Ia conduite des gendarmes a Ia Martinique; one as a 
banker; and only Maisonneuve signed as a merchant. 18 A year later, on 
5 March 1755, four new syndics included another interesse ... , an agent de 
change, a retired garde du corps and one who listed himself as a merchant 
but was listed in the Almanach royal as a Paris banker. 19 They soon 
became embroiled in a quarrel with Maisonneuve and he withdrew his 
14 A.N., zm 130. The group following Goossens signed a procuration for him 
before the notary Marchand on 28 Aug. 1751. For Goossens' identity see my notes, "Le 
Ravitaillement de Quebec en 1758," Histoire sociale-Social History, V, 9 (April 1972), 
p.8l. 
15 Bibliotheque nationale, mss. Joly de Fleury 303, Programme de Ia Compagnie 
sous /e titre d'Assurances generales, etablie ii Paris par acte d'association homologue 
ii l'amiraute generale de France, au siege de Ia Table de Marbre, par sentence du 15 Dec. 
1753, 3pp. printed. 
16 B.N., mss. Joly de Fleury 303, fols. 365-369, Maisonneuve to de le Roue, 
28 Nov. 1753. The founding act of this company is in A.N., zm 129 and in M.C., etude 
XLV, 27 Sept. 1753. 
17 Prevost's account show gains of 55,525 livres and losses of 101,785 livres (A.N., 
ZIA 915). 
18 Some members of this company are listed in Table 2. 
19 These were Louis Dufour de Montlouis, Jacques-Raymond Daly, Jean-Charles 
Boucher, and Louis Valmalette. 
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investments and retired in December 1756. Whether or not he saw this 
second company as tom between commer~ants andfinanciers - this is not 
clear - the issue in this quarrel was whether to change the company's 
policy after August 1755 when the British began to seize merchant ships, 
or whether to carry on as usual, as the membership generally wanted to 
do. 20 Maisonneuve advised distinguishing between sea risks, which he 
was prepared to go on insuring, and war risks, which he was not; he 
also wanted the company to insist on recovering premiums due in a port 
before paying insurance due there. These ideas he put into effect in 1755 
and 1756 until he was driven out of office and quit the company. All 
this was later made clear in an anonymous memorandum written by one 
of the members anxious to persuade others to meet the financial disasters 
of the company by inviting Maisonneuve to return, but he did not re-
tum.21 
These two companies did not dissolve or formally go bankrupt and 
no union of creditors was formed; they merely closed their doors through-
out most of the Seven Years War and suffered an agonizing period of 
litigation, some ninety-two cases involving the 1750 company alone. Only 
seventeen of these had been settled by the end of 1762. 22 In some cases 
the companies dragged merchants through the courts to extract from them 
a wartime premium of 35 percent applicable from June 1755, when the 
British fleet had seized the first French warships, instead of from 27 
August when the Admiralty had given orders to seize all French ships in 
general. 23 With this unpromising beginning the two companies revived 
after the Seven Years War and limped on until the American War of 
Independence, insuring ships and cargoes wherever possible but never 
doing very well. In 1770 the creditors of the bankrupt postal cashier, 
Billard, had little hope of recovering the 72,000 livres from the 1753 
company listed among his assets because, they wrote, "cette entreprise 
est tombee dans le plus grand discredit et pour en retirer quelques bene-
fices et Ia relever il y faudroit mettre des fonds considerables qui seroient 
20 On 6 May 1757 the Deputes de Commerce in Paris recommended 10 June 
1755 for the seas around Canada and Newfoundland and 26 August 1755 for the rest. 
(A.N. , F 12 711). 
21 A.N., ztA 915 (Prevost papers), ms. unsigned and undated, 61/2 pp. 
22 M.C., etude CXVIII 460, minutes for 20 Dec. 1764. The archives and libraries 
of Paris and the ports hold much material printed and manuscript on the legal battles over 
insurance at the end of the Seven Years War. One factum, Observations pour les syn-
dics et directeurs des deux chambres d'Assurances de Paris, 1765, (B.N., Fz 1285), summa-
rizes the financial history of these companies in part. The 1750 company was, it relates, 
capitalized at 4,600,000 livres and earned 1,400,000 livres but during the war suffered 
losses of 883,126 livres on ships seized by the British and 117,692 livres on ships "which 
perished while fleeing from the enemy." The 1753 company capitalized at four million 
livres , paid out about 1,200,000 livres on ships seized or lost at sea, and earned 500,000 
livres which were not clear profit but merely earned in premiums. It is clear that the 
capital sums were merely subscribed by signatures ; the members did not actually pay 
the money and making them pay when the "subscribed" capital was needed was one of 
the greatest problems. 
23 Much of this quarrel is explained in Memoire pour les Sieurs Beaupied Dumes-
nil, Thourons freres, Gasan & autres contre les Directeurs & Syndics des Chambres 
d'Assurances de Paris, 23 pp. with British documents appended to prove the British 
Admiralty's intentions (Arch. dep. de Ia Charente maritime, La Rochelle, 4 J 2269). 
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encore bien avanturees." 24 In general, these companies seem to have 
played the same role in the field of insurance that John Law's company 
played in the field of French central banking; that is, their initial attraction 
for businessmen, their failures and long agonies, stood as a lesson and a 
warning against other ventures in the field. Why, then, did they fail? 
Maisonneuve would no doubt have said, if asked this question, that 
the membership of these companies ruined them. A careful analysis of the 
membership - some four score names for each company - would be 
interesting, but it would also be long and tedious because so many of 
the members were small speculators who left little trace in historical 
records. Take, for instance, Bert de Saint Germain, originally from Lyon, 
calling himself an interesse dans les affaires du Roy and dabbling in army 
supplies. He took fifteen shares (interets) in the 1750 company with a 
total face value of 45,000 livres, yet two years later his house and lands 
of Saint Germain de Val were sold up by royal commissioners presumably 
for debt, and he died in 1767 leaving three grown-up but unmarried 
daughters with little more than the furniture in their dwelling above a 
candlemaker's shop. 25 Another example is Marin Bradel, one of the first 
members of the 1753 company, born into a family of Norman labourers 
and buried as "ci-devant interesse dans les sous-fermes du Roy" in the 
presence of three nephews who were avocats au Parlement and one of 
them also a secretary to Barentin, First President of the Cour des Aides. 26 
Many others were the sons of families able to start them off in life with 
royal offices, such as Thomas-Leonore Germain (1720-76) of the 1753 
company, avocat au Parlement, secretaire du Roy, son and brother of 
goldsmiths-to-the-King, brother-in-law of a doctor at the Faculty of 
Medicine; 27 or again, Boivin d'Hardancourt of the 1750 company, also 
secretaire du Roy, nephew of a Director of the Indies Company and 
related to a Receiver General of Finance, Fillion de Villemure, who also 
joined the company. 28 More colourful were the minor brasseurs d'affaires, 
big businessmen such as the Delaleu brothers, sons of a Flemish mer-
chant who obtained for one of them a dowry of 80,000 livres, brothers 
of a Colonel Captain of the Paris Guards, relatives of a well-known 
Farmer General of Taxes, Dupleix de Bacquencourt, speculators in 
property and jobbery, fast acquiring houses and royal offices by the time 
their business collapsed under the weight of their debts in 1765; 29 and 
again, the dashing cashier of the postal farms, Billard, one of the syndics 
of the 1753 company, who invested several millions of his employers' 
funds in every enterprise he could find before going bankrupt in 1769. 30 
24 A.N., T 25-6, Etat general des effets actifs du Sieur Billard ... ms. 
25 A.N., Y 13119, scelle of 23 Aug. 1767; inventory in M.C., CXXI, 4 Sept. 1767. 
26 M.C., CXVII, 1075, Bradel died 12 Jan. 1782. 
27 A.N., Y 15386, scelle of 25 July 1776, the day of his death; inventory in M.C., 
maitre Dupre, 6 August 1776; also A.N., V 2 43, 3 Feb. 1758. 
28 A.N., Y 14405, scelle of 3 Dec. 1758; inventory in M.C., LXIX 681, 22 Dec. 
1758. 
29 Charles and Joseph DELALEU, M.C., en 438, 8 april 1765, acte d'abandon 
and the union des creanciers dated 17 May 1765; A.N., V 2 41, 24 April 1738. 
30 The case of Fran!(ois-Pierre Billard is summarized in my article, "The French 
Crisis of 1770," History (London), LVII (Feb. 1972), p. 25. 
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What most of the members of both companies had in common was 
a consuming ambition to make a quick fortune, not in trade, least of all 
maritime trade, which required experience, knowledge, and continuous 
hard work, but in Les finances, as it was understood in the eighteenth 
century; that is, in gathering, spending and manipulating government 
funds with all that this implied. For these men, the marine insurance 
companies were speculative ventures in which they bought their shares 
(interets) mainly on credit by signing for them. For example, the royal 
Treasurer General for the ponts et chaussees, Gabriel Prevost, held 
twenty certijicats representing an investment of 60,000 Livres in the 1753 
company, but had put up no more than 3,000 Livres of this in cash. 31 
Their credit, which was a bottom nothing more than the confidence they 
could inspire in others, depended partly on an impression that there were 
rich or noble relations in the background, partly on the prestige of royal 
offices usually purchased on credit but seeming to give promise of greater 
things to come, and partly on the mysterious flurry of business in which 
they seemed to be engaged with one of the military supply companies, 
the tax farms or subfarms, the suppliers to royalty, or the real estate or 
estate management enterprises. They had no intention of working steadily 
at marine insurance; after awhile the members of the 1753 company did 
not bother to attend meetings and even the directors neglected company 
business. 32 Not for them the laborious life of the counting house where 
merchants spent most of their time. The famous merchant-banker of this 
period, Jean-Joseph Laborde, tells how he began life with the clerks in 
his cousin's trading firm at Bayonne, a five-year apprenticeship without 
pay, working at his desk from five in the morning until midnight, never 
going out except to church and constantly persecuted by his employer's 
wife. "You will not know," he wrote to his son later, "how much [effort] 
it costs in Trade to earn large sums of money. Things are not at all the 
same in Finance wherein immense and rapid fortunes are to be seen.'' 33 
Laborde in later life was proud of being a merchant and merchant-banker 
rather than a financier, and when he lent his money to the Crown or 
managed the Crown's business in his capacity as Court Banker, he wanted 
it to be known that he did so as a merchant-banker. He despised the 
financiers who made quick fortunes manipulating Crown funds. 
Marine insurance in the eighteenth century, like banking, was prop-
erly an affair of merchants, not of financiers. The managers of successful 
insurance companies in London, Rotterdam, and the French ports were 
merchants and so were most of the private underwriters. Who but mer-
chants could judge the risks at sea, assess the value of ships and cargoes, 
and deal on an equal footing with other merchants? As the great Bordeaux 
magistrate, Montesquieu, put it in his reflections on the 1750 insurance 
company. 
31 A.N., Z IA 915, printed form of the notary Arrnet (Paris), 19 June 1758. 
32 Loc. cit., undated unsigned manuscript memorandum. 
33 J.J. DE LABORDE, Memoires, admirably edited by Yves Durand in the Annuaire-
Bulletin de Ia Societe de l'Histoire de France, 1968-69 (1971), pp. 116 and 119. 
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In the seaports a company of merchants gathers together to underwrite insur-
ance. They know their work and inform each other; they know whether the 
ship they are insuring is good or bad, whether the crew is good or bad, 
whether the captain is experienced and wise or ignorant and confused, whether 
the shippers are suspect, of good reputation or likely to be dishonest, whether 
the voyage is to be long, whether the season is beginning well or not; they 
know everything because everyone makes it his business to find out. In Paris 
they know nothing and for the Company to know all that, it would lose as 
much in the cost of postal charges and correspondence as it would earn in 
premiums. 34 
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There were, it must be said, a certain number of merchants in the 
insurance companies of 1750 and 1753 but besides the geographical defect 
mentioned by Montesquieu, they suffered from their small numbers, they 
and their kind being out-voted and over-ruled by the rest. Furthermore, 
some of them were not wholly merchants in Laborde's sense of the term. 
Goossens was trading in naval timber and other supplies and in naval 
finances, and Pierre-Guillaume Merlin was promoting such ventures as a 
privateering company in which he was the front man for high royal offi-
cials. Then, at least six of them, including Goossens and Merlin, went 
bankrupt during the Seven Years War and may be suspected of joining 
the insurance companies on speculation to repair their sagging fortunes 
or, at least, to secure quick profits. 35 The principal Paris merchants and 
merchant-bankers for the most part kept away from these insurance 
companies and in 1755 decided to form one of their own. 
The Paris bankers' company, called simply La Compagnie d'Assu-
rance, was the fourth company to be formed there in less than a decade. 
It was founded for a term of four years by an act of 6 and 7 July 1755 
comprising twenty-eight clauses ; this act was signed by eighteen members 
of whom nine signed for firms in which they were partners. 36 They 
described themselves collectively as "banquiers et negociants de Paris" 
and at least fifteen of them were listed in the Almanach royal as "ban-
quiers pours les traites et remises de place en place." We recognize them 
as prominent Paris bankers with maritime interests, most of whom were 
in trade as well as lending money to other merchants. Among them were 
two disappointed members of the earlier insurance companies: Louis 
Valmalette, a member of the 1753 company and Goossens, who quit the 
1750 company and never joined the one formed in 1753. One of the differ-
ences between this bankers' company and the previous two was that each 
of these Paris bankers already had connections with shipping merchants 
in the ports and the company intended to maintain these direct links, 
drawing prominent merchants of seaports into the company not as agents 
but as equal partners. All members were to be jointly liable, solidaires, as 
the founding act declared in its first clause. The plan was to limit the 
Paris membership to twenty and invite thirty members in the seaports. 
34 MoNTESQUJEU, "Mes Pensees," no. 341, in Oeuvres compli~tes, (Paris, Mac-
millan (Editions du Seuil), 1964), p. 889. 
3s Laurent Woulfe, Jean Sellon, Amy Pictet, Nicolas-Robert Darcy, Pierre-
Guillaume Merlin, and Pierre-Francois Goossens. 
36 A copy of the founding act may be found in A.N., Z 10 130 and another in 
M.C., LXXXIV, 7 July 1755. The founding members are listed in Table 3. 
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Table l.- LACHAMBRE o'ASSURANCE ET GROSSE AVENTURE, or LA COMPAGNIE o'Assu-
RANCES, founded on 29 January 1750 : the principal members37 
The Founding Members 
Nicolas Boulliaud (or Bouillaud), armateur 
de Paris 
Pierre Bourdeaux, negociant de Paris 
Pierre-Fran~ois Dayrolles Desangles, ne-
gociant de Lodeve en Languedoc 
Claude Hilaire de Maisonneuve, negociant 
de Paris et Lyon 
Guillaume de Materre, avocat au Parle-
ment et armateur (withdrew on 16 Sept. 
1751) 
Jean-Baptiste Montaigu, seigneur de Ia 
Roche 
Charles-Fran~ois Remy, negociant de 
Paris 
Hugues Simon, negociant 
The Committee of 16 June 1751 
Louis-Claude Boivin d'Hardancourt, secre-
taire du Roi 
Jean-Henry Bousquet, bourgeois de Paris, 
listed in 1757 as negociant de Paris 
Pierre-Isaac Dupont, bourgeois de Paris 
Nicolas-Antoine Fleureau, ecuyer, interesse 
dans les fermes du Roi 
Pierre-Fran~ois Goossens, interesse dans 
les fournitures de Ia Marine 
Antoine-Jean-Baptiste Le Prevost de 
Quesnel, bourgeois de Paris 
Jacques Le Roy, negociant 
Henry-Nicolas Morin de Ia Sabloniere, 
ecuyer, interesse dans les affaires du 
Roi 
Joseph-Pierre Piquefeu de Longpre, secre-
taire du Roi 
Constantin-Joseph Perrier, ancien receveur 
general des domaines et bois 
Amy Pictet, banquier de Paris 
Alexis Regny, bourgeois de Paris 
Jean Sellon le jeune, banquier de Paris 
Balthazard-Fran~ois de Villeneuve, inte-
resse dans les fermes du Roi 
The Committee of 19 May 1752 
Jacques Accarias de Serionne, secretaire 
du Roi 
Jean-Henry Bousquet, bourgeois de Paris, 
listed in 1757 as negociant de Paris 
Armand-Jean-Fevre Dannoy, secretaire du 
Roi 
Frederic-Louis Delescluze, depute du 
commerce de Lille 
Antoine-Jean-Baptiste Le Prevost de 
Quesnel, bourgeois de Paris 
Joseph Marion, depute du commerce de 
Saint-Malo 
Amy Pictet, banquier de Paris 
Alexis Regny, bourgeois de Paris 
Table 2. -LA COMPAGNIE o'ASSURANCES GENERALES MARITIMES ET INCENDIAIRES 
founded on 27 September 1753: some of the principal members 38 
The Managing Committee on 22 March 
1754 
Fran~ois-Pierre Billard, interesse aux affai-
res du Roi 
Fran~ois Bordier, interesse aux affaires du 
Roi 
Marin Bradel, interesse aux affaires du 
Roi 
Claude Hilaire de Maisonneuve, negociant 
de Paris et Lyon 
Patrice-Pichaud Dupavillon, conseiller du 
Roi, commissaire a Ia conduite des gen-
darmes a Ia Martinique 
Jean-Marie Mongirod, banquier 
The Managing Committee on 22 February 
1759 
Claude Bonnet, payeur des rentes 
Jean-Felix Gourdain, ecuyer 
Louis-Honore, comte d'Houel, ci-devant 
ministre du roi extraordinaire en Aile-
magne 
Fran~ois-Octave de Milleville, controleur 
general des domaines et bois 
Andre-Charles Modeux de Saint Wast, 
ecuyer 
Gabriel Prevost, tresorier general des ponts 
et chaussees 
Poulain de Vaujoye 
Other Notable Members 
Claude Billard Dumonceaux, ecuyer, 
payeur des rentes 
37 The founding act and extensive minutes of meetings are recorded in M.C. , 
CXVIII 459 and 460; another copy of the act and other references in A.N., Z 10 129. A 
few of the members of all three insurance companies turn up in Herbert LUTHY, La 
Banque protestante (Paris, 1961), II, and in J.F. BosHER, French Finances, 1770-1795 
(Cambridge, 1970). 
38 The founding act is in A.N., zm 129 and another copy in M.C., XLV, 27 Sept. 
1753. 
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Jean-Charles Boucher, ancien garde du 
corps 
Jacques-Raymond Daly, agent de change 
Philippe-Nicolas Demolliere, payeur des 
rentes 
Louis-Claude Dupin de Francoeil, receveur 
general de Metz 
Jean-Ollivier Boutray, ecuyer, ancien eche-
vin de Paris 
Jean-Baptiste Darcy, secretary of the com-
pany, 1756-1766 
Thomas-Leonore Germain, avocat au Par-
lement 
Antoine de Lacombe,fermier du Roy 
Jean Lasseray, marchand, bourgeois de 
Paris 
Pierre-Louis de Saint Janvier, payeur des 
rentes, shareholder in the caisse d' es-
compte of 1778 
Louis de Valmalette, negociant 
Nicolas Piault, interesse aux affaires du 
Roi 
Claude Torrent, negociant 
Etienne Bignon, negociant 
Table 3.- LA COMPAGNIE o 'AsSURANCE, founded on 6 and 7 July 1755 39 
Christophe-Jean Baur (of the firm Tourton 
et Baur) 
Gabriel-Jullien BoutTe (ofBouffe, Dangirard 
et fils aine) 
Louis Chabbert (of Chabbert et Banquet) 
Jean Cottin (of Jean Cottin l'aine et fils) 
Henry Dumas (of Dumas, Ricateau et 
Compagnie) 
Sauveur Duvergier 
Simon-Amage Gilly de Montaud 
Pierre-Fran~ois Goossens (from the insur-
ance company of 1750) 
Jean-Pierre Kolly (big naval supply mer-
chant) 
Marc Lullin (of Jean Lui/in, frere et asso-
cie) 
Jean Masson de Malboue 
Louis-Daniel Ragueneau de Ia Chesnay 
Philippe-Benjamin Raguenneau de Ia 
Chesnay 
These brothers, Protestant bankers in 
Paris, had another brother, Henry-
Charles, "demeurant a Beverley, comte 
d'Yorck en Angleterre" in 1772 (see 
Arch. nat. Paris, minutier central, etude 
LXXXIII, 536, 7 June 1769, portage) 
Louis Tourton (of Tourton et Baur) 
Louis Valmalette (from the insurance com-
pany of 1753) 
Pierre-Julie Darlu 
Louis Lafrete (of Lafrete freres Aribert et 
Compagnie) 
Jacques Desbriere (of Veuve Desbriere et 
fi Is, with extensive interests in maritime 
trade) 
On 5 July 1755, two days before the signing of the founding act, one 
member firm, Chabbert et Banquet, wrote to a client firm in Bordeaux, 
Gradis et Compagnie, to ask whether they would like to join. 40 
The invitation to such merchants as Gradis was to join a company 
that would inevitably be dominated by Paris merchant-bankers, and Gradis 
refused. Probably others also refused. There is evidence that some of the 
Paris members soon reverted to their own private underwriting, which 
was expressly forbidden by article twenty-one of the founding act, on 
pain of a thousand livres fine, and no sign of the company's renewal 
during the summer of 1759 has come to light. It was supposed to expire 
on 1 August 1759 unless renewed first. But the late summer of 1759 was a 
time of great strain in French business and financial circles as well as at 
sea, hardly a time to renew a marine insurance company. At least two 
members of the company went bankrupt, Dumas, Ricateau et Compagnie 
39 The founding act is in M.C., LXXXIV, 7 July 1755 and another copy in A.N., 
Z ID 130. All or nearly all of the members were Paris merchant-bankers. On Gilly de 
Montaud, see CHAUSSINAND-NOGARET, Les Financiers de Languedoc (Paris, 1970), and for 
some of the others, LUTHY, op. cit., II. 
40 Paul BuTEL, La Croissance commerciale bordelaise, 1, p. 702. 
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in May 1758 and Goossens in November 1759 after the Crown's partial 
bankruptcy. I suspect this insurance company lasted only for the four 
years of its first term. The Paris company known to have been insuring 
in the 1770s was probably one of the earlier companies whose members 
could not hope to do much underwriting as individuals and were able to 
stay in the field only in company. 41 
The history of the Paris insurance companies, when it comes to be 
written, will show - or so it now seems -a persistent failure owing to 
the salient character of the Paris business community. As Montesquieu 
wrote in his notes at Bordeaux soon after the company of 1750 was 
formed, "The insurance company in Paris [of 1750] has no common sense; 
it is clear to me that it cannot succeed." One of Montesquieu's reflections 
on the subject, which he noted with a view to considering it for a revised 
edition of The Spirit of Laws, begins, "There is no one so stupid in 
matters of trade as the Parisians. They are businessmen [gens d'affaire] 
who, having become suddenly and easily rich, imagine that it will be easy 
to enrich themselves even further. They even believe that they owe their 
wealth to their brains." 42 Paris businessmen were for the most part 
speculators, especially those interested in maritime trade. There was, of 
course, as all merchants knew, a large element of speculation in the trade 
of the ports where profits depended upon fluctuating prices and markets 
at home and overseas, on the hazards of war and the sea, and on other 
unpredictable factors. Yet the speculations of a merchant shipping goods 
from port to port, even gold and silver bullion or Spanish pieces of eight, 
were very different from the speculations of a royal tax collector or pay-
master looking for a quick return on short-term investments of the Crown 
funds in his keeping, or the Crown official using his authority and the 
prestige of his position to promote a trading venture in collaboration with 
a front man, a prete-nom. To the eighteenth-century merchant, and to 
many disinterested observers, trade seemed honest and les finances 
dishonest. In this sense, Paris had a corrupting influence on the ports by 
the behaviour of government officials and financiers who were so often 
speculators on the side. 
II 
Most government officials, officeholders, and financiers who could 
venture into maritime trade did so, some furtively and others openly. The 
story of the scandalous affaire du Canada in which the royal Intendant 
at Quebec and some fifty of his subordinates were prosecuted for the 
fortunes they made in trading during the Seven Years·War reveals not the 
conspiracy of corrupt individuals, as has always been said, but the normal 
behaviour of the Bourbon government's servants in the eighteenth cen-
tury. 43 This may be seen, to take another example, in the lives of the 
41 Lac. cit. 
42 MONTESQUIEU, Lac. cit . 
43 This interpretation is explained in my forthcoming article, "The French 
Government's Motives in the affaire du Canada," The English Historical Review. 
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agents which the Treasurers General of the Marine and Colonies posted 
in the ports of France and the colonies. They went into trade in the same 
spirit of speculation as other financiers went into marine insurance and 
thought of their posts as presenting opportunities. A clerk in the Treasur-
ers General's office wrote a revealing letter to another who had just been 
offered the Rochefort post, "[this post] may be worth as much as the one 
you have now, not only for its salary [appointments] but also for the 
trade it may enable you to carry on with the colonies." 44 Some examples 
may help to put the insurance companies into proper perspective. 
The Treasurers General's agent, usually called Tresorier de Ia Mari-
ne, was a salaried agent of the Treasurers General in Paris whose formal 
authority (procuration) he held, but his position or prestige such as it 
was, served all too often as a basis for an extensive private business. 
Jean-Baptiste Violette at Saint Malo fitted out several fishing vessels 
which sailed annually to the Newfoundland banks or to Louisbourg during 
the early 1750s. 45 Cargoes of fish were sold for him at Marseille where 
he dealt with the firm of Famin et Montagne, who sent him return cargoes 
of soap and other goods to sell in the colonies. He sent off consignments 
of goods to the West Indies in other men's ships and during the Seven 
Years War invested in privateering. At Bayonne, Jean Bourdette also 
went into shipping but on a much larger scale, sometimes in association 
with Frigiere et Barthez of Bordeaux and with various Bayonne shipping 
firms, notably Jean Barrere, Dominique Lannes, and his own brother-in-
law, Dhiharce Dalsuyt de Hasparren. 46 The traces of shares in ships and 
expeditions are numerous in the inventory made at his death. In addition, 
he was active in procuring timber for the fleet, especially after the Seven 
Years War in association with one of the biggest general contractors for 
naval timber, Jean-Louis-Michel Petel. Bourdette at his death was pre-
paring a set of silver tableware market with Petel's coat of arms to send 
him as a gift. Among the interests of Jacques-Antoine Menard, the trea-
surer at Rennes, were a one-quarter interest in a ship, La Complaisance 
de Saint Malo, and in 1763 he bought a one-sixteenth interest in another, 
Le Due de Choiseul. 47 At Lorient, Laurent Bourgeois invested in a 
contract of 1763 with Arnous freres to exploit woodlands for naval tim-
44 Arch. dep. de Ia Charente Maritime [La Rochelle], B 4055, Couteau to Brunet 
de Beranger, 27 Sept. 1763. 
4 s Arch. dep. de I'lle-et-Vilaine, minutes of notary Thomas Etesse, 1 Feb. 1764, 
scelle and inventory for Violette; minutes of notary Le Bellegon pere, 2 March 1754 and of 
notary Pitot for 1750 passim; 9 B 504*, 1 March 1751, PARIS-JALLOBERT, Anciens registres, 
the standard reference work, is mistaken in its genealogy of Violette, who was born 13 
April 1708 at Saint Malo, son of Jacques Violette and Perine Hebert; he married Anne-
Fran~oise Pelle on 19 Feb. 1737 and died on 24 Dec. 1763. 
43 Jean Bourdette, son of Dominique Bourdette (also naval treasurer) and Domi-
nique Sorhainde (married 23 Sept. 1711), became treasurer by procuration dated 19 April 
1747 and died on 6 June 1765. (His death inventory, 315 pp., is in Arch. dep. des Basses-
Pyrenees [Pau], III E 3884 [de Monho], 28 April 1766.) 
47 Jacques-Antoine Menard (or Mesnard) born on 15 Oct. 1711, son of Michel 
Menard, sieur des Loges and of Nicole Rousseau and died on 27 Nov. 1767 at Rennes. 
He was already Receveur des tabacs when made naval treasurer by procuration on 8 and 
10 Jan. 1756. (His death inventory is in Arch. dep. de l'lle-et-Vilaine [Rennes], 2 B 588.) 
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her. 48 At Rochefort_, Breard held notes of a Martinique merchant, Goth-
man de Luppe, totalling 305,000 livres and invested half a million livres 
in the cannon foundries of La Chapelle and de Josneliere. 49 Of course 
the treasurers also invested in real estate, in venal offices, and in royal 
and private rentes - Bourdette was rich in rentes . They were by no 
means wholly merchants, or even merchants at all in the ordinary sense 
of the term; they were ambitious financial speculators in search of a 
profit wherever it was to be found. Two special cases will illustrate this 
point further. 
In 1762, near the end of the Seven Years War, the Treasurers Gen-
eral in Paris sent one of their clerks, a certain Jean-Rene Brunet de Beran-
ger, to clear up the accounts of previous agents in some of the Atlantic 
ports. He visited Lorient and other ports but lived mainly at Rochefort, 
ostensibly to deal with the accounts of the late treasurer, Antoine Val-
liet. so In 1765 he began to think of going into trade and of making a profit 
on transfers of funds for naval supply merchants. His friend in Paris, 
Fran~ois Couteau, another employee of the Treasurers General, agreed 
with him that the service of the Treasurers General was no way to make 
a fortune but had doubts about trade. "[Years ago] I wanted to do some-
thing by going into trade which I did not understand ; it cost me a great 
deal and I am not yet free of my debts" ; Couteau nevertheless let himself 
be persuaded. In less than a year Brunet was sending him liqueur to sell 
in Paris and Couteau was sending Brunet cloth, stockings, shoes, and 
other clothing partly, it seems, for sale to the navy and colonies. They 
were planning to sell tobacco in the colonies, to begin a trading venture 
to Spain and to work for naval timber supply merchants. Brunet hired a 
clerk and rented a warehouse in Rochefort. He began to act as a commis-
sion agent for merchants of other ports such as Louis Pourcin, Bethman 
and Desclaux and Jean-Andre Lamaletie of Bordeaux, and Jean Corpron 
of Nantes. His merchant clients no longer addressed him as "commis de 
Messieurs les Tresoriers generaux de Ia Marine" but as "negociant," and 
that is what he became when in 1766 he quit the treasury service. 
The funds for these activities were raised by Brunet using what 
treasury funds he could, drawing drafts in Rochefort on Couteau in Paris 
and sending bills of exchange, reconnaissances du Canada, and other 
paper instruments on which payment was due in Paris or which might at 
least be negotiated there at a discount. They were perenially short of 
funds. Couteau reported that his purchases of clothing had to be paid for 
48 Laurent Bourgeois was naval treasurer from 1755 until his death on 10 Oct. 
1785 at St. Caradec, Hennebout, Brittany, aged 63. His correspondence with the Tresoriers 
generaux is at Lorient in the Archives de Ia Marine, 1 E5 1 etc. 
49 Marcellin-Nicolas Breard, born 5 June 1714, son of Jacques Breard and Ma-
rieanne Marcellin, was colonial treasurer at Rochefort from April 1758 to 1776 and died on 
28 Feb. 1785. He was brother of the notorious naval controller at Quebec, Jacques-Michel 
Breard, and his business interests were extensive; the brother was one of the officials 
sentenced in the Affaire du Canada . 
50 The Brunet de Beranger correspondence with Couteau is in Arch. dep. de Ia 
Charente maritime [La Rochelle] , B 4053 to 4058; see also M.C., LX 352, procuration 
dated 16 Feb- 1764. 
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immediately and on one occasion when he could not pay cash a manu-
facturer came to his house and took back a load of stockings. They 
borrowed from their friends, including another treasury agent in Paris, 
Philippe Sandre, but in December 1766 Sandre wanted his money back 
and Brunet was pressing Couteau to find 20,000 livres somewhere "in 
order to support my enterprise which is the best, the soundest and the 
most lucrative that one could have in Rochefort." 51 Throughout 1767 
Brunet was besieged by creditors and when in November a Treasurer 
General came from Paris and charged him before the local court, Brunet 
fled and his property was confiscated for his creditors. Brunet had learned 
to his cost that a quick fortune in trade was not to be had and certainly 
not by the manipulative methods of the Paris financiers. The methods 
Brunet had learned in the service of the naval treasurers were summed 
up later by another port treasurer, Bonvallet des Brosses of La Rochelle: 
"The provincial treasurers and receivers draw on their chiefs [in Paris]. 
Little by little circulation is established. Credit grows; drafts are taken; 
funds are invested ; financial hoarding takes place," and as he went on to 
explain, the treasurers and receivers in this way generated funds for 
their own business ventures. 52 Bonvallet des Brosses knew what he was 
talking about for he, too, had tried to get into trade and failed. 
Bonvallet's is a more spectacular case than Brunet's. When he 
inherited the post of treasurer sometime in the early 1760s it had been in 
his family since the beginning of the century and they had acquired other 
offices such as Receveur des decimes held by his father; in 1768 his 
brother bought an office of Tresorier de France from the naval treasurer 
at Rochefort, Breard. 53 About the same time, shortly after Brunet de 
Beranger's brief career, which they must have watched with interest -
he even owed them money - Bonvallet and his brother formed a trading 
firm under the name of Bonvallet freres. 54 The brother went off to Paris 
in March 1768 and set up as a Paris negociant, described in some docu-
ments as a banker, with a bookkeeper, a confidential assistant, two 
lackeys, a coachman, and an office decorated with portraits of Frederick 
the Great of Prussia in a feathered hat and Diderot of the French academy 
en petit cheveux. Thus equiped, Bonvallet freres began to have dealings 
with merchants in Paris, London, and most of the main French ports. 
They invested 50,000 livres in a ship, La Carlotta, which they dispatched 
to Louisiana; over 8,000 livres in Le Bien Aime owned by a Bordeaux 
merchant, Auger de la Gameraye; 35,000 livres in Le Crus sol which sank 
off Bordeaux in a hurricane on 8 April 1769; and much more in expedi-
s• Arch. dep. de Ia Charente maritime [La Rochelle], B 4057, Brunet to Couteau 
24 Jan. 1767. 
sl StMON-JOSEPH-XA VIER, Moyens de simplifier Ia perception et Ia comptabilite 
des deniers royaux, 1789, 116 pp. (Bib!. nat., Paris, Lb 39 7248), p. 4. The treasurer's 
brother who went to Paris was Jean-Jacques-Stanislas Bonvallet des Brosses, born 12 Aug. 
1738 and died by suicide 27 Nov. 1769. They were sons of Jean-Jacques Bonvallet des 
Brosses, Receveur des decimes ecclesiastiques and Madeleine Fontaine. 
Sl A.N., v• 444, lettres de provision for him dated 13 Sept. 1768. 
s4 A.N., Y 13962, scelle for Bonvallet des Brosses dated 28 Nov. 1769; M.C., 
XCVII, 30 July 1770, Attermoiement, Monsieur Bonvallet et ses creanciers; and A.N., 
T 2 3-4 affaires Billard, various references to business links with Bonvallet freres. 
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tions to the colonies, in sugar sent to Hamburg, and in other trading 
ventures. 
Where did all this money come from? There are no proper accounts 
but we can identify several different sources in Paris and the ports which 
show that a great deal of credit was accessible to the enterprising busi-
nessman with financial connections. First, they used funds from the naval 
treasurer's holdings in La Rochelle and raised more by the paper methods 
Bonvallet later described in his book. That is, the two brothers, one in 
Paris and the other at La Rochelle, drew drafts on each other. Secondly, 
they attracted large investments from the notorious postal cashier, Billard 
(some 48,300 livres) who had also invested in the marine insurance com-
pany of 1750, from a Farmer General, Bouret de Vezelay (76,000 livres), 
and a number of others more difficult to identify. Thirdly, they ran up 
accounts with merchants and merchant-bankers in various cities, in-
cluding Georges-Tobie Thelusson et Compagnie of Paris, and Charles 
Legrand, pere et fils of Paris and La Rochelle who performed such ser-
vices as drawing 2,000 florins on the Amsterdam firm of Duissenberg and 
Voogler. By the end of 1769 the firm's balance worked out at something 
like 133,922 livres in recoverable assets ( actif) and 709,475 livres in debts 
and losses, including heavy losses from such bankrupt debtors as Joseph 
Querenet, the former treasurer to the Prince de Conti (187,097 livres) 
and the firm of Le Grand, pere et fils (109,904 livres). Bonvallet freres 
were caught up in the chain of failures that were part of the approaching 
French crisis of 1770. ss Faced with this terrible situation, the Paris part-
ner in the firm closed himself in his rooms on 27 November 1769 and 
blew his brains out with a pistol. The firm went through the usual bank-
ruptcy proceedings and the family at La Rochelle suffered accordingly. 
Bonvallet des Brosses, Brunet de Beranger, and the other naval 
treasurers in the ports were all animated by the spirit of the Paris finan-
ciers whose agents they were, the same spirit that moved the members 
of the Indies Company, the Baron d'Huart Company, the Guadalcanal 
Company, and other ventures based in Paris, including the marine insu-
rance companies. 56 What has been seen by some scholars as a fever of 
speculation in Paris during the late 1780s was not new then; it was in 
fact the normal behaviour of the Paris business community. This spirit 
and this behaviour were, as Montesquieu observed, inimical to maritime 
trade. The Paris money market was, as George V. Taylor declared some 
years ago, a trading centre for financiers and speculators, agioteurs, bras-
seurs d'affaires, but not for merchants. 57 In this the Paris bourse was 
55 J.P. BosHER, "The French Crisis of 1770," History (London), LVII (Feb. 1972): 
17-30. 
56 For the indies Company see Herbert LUTHY, La Banque protestante, passim. 
For the Guadalcanal Company see Guy CHAUSSINAND-NOGARET, "A Propos d'une entreprise 
fran~aise en Espagne au XVIII" siecle: les societaires de Ia Compagnie de Guadalcanal," 
Revue d' Histoire moderne et contemporaine, XX (1973): 13-33; and for the d'Huart 
Company, J.P. BosHER, "A Fishing Company of Louisbourg, les Sables d'Olonne and 
Paris : Ia Societe du Baron d'Huart, 1750-1775," French Historical Studies, IX (1975): 
263-77. 
57 George V. TAYLOR, " The Paris Bourse on the Eve of the Revolution, 
1781-1789," American Historical Review, 67 (1962): 951-77. 
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different from the bourses at Bordeaux, Bayonne, Rouen, Nantes, or 
Marseille, which were administered by merchants for merchants. Cor-
rupted by the Bourbon financial system, Paris played no great role in 
French overseas trade, at least not by assisting the seaports and not as a 
centre for marine insurance. The inland position of Paris was only one 
reason for this failure; the other was the Crown's domination of the 
Paris business community. 
